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In this paper it is introduced a generic large cardinal akin to I0, together with the consequences of ℵω being
such a generic large cardinal. In this case ℵω is Jo´nsson, and in a choiceless inner model many properties hold
that are in contrast with pcf theory in ZFC.
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1 Introduction
What are generic large cardinals? As there is no specific definition of the notion of large cardinal, we can expect
the same for generic large cardinals. Yet one can identify some vague pattern: All the large cardinal axioms
of a certain strength postulate the existence of an elementary embedding of the form j : V ≺ M , where M
is an inner model of V with some closure properties, and the relevant large cardinal is the critical point of the
embedding (or, more rarely, the supremum of critical points of such embeddings); therefore we call generic large
cardinals the critical points of elementary embeddings of the form j : V ≺ M ⊆ V [G], where M is an inner
model of some generic extension of V . We can date back the origin of generic large cardinals to the introduction
by Solovay of the generic ultrapower, and then to the definition by Jech and Prikry in [15] of the precipitous
ideal, whose generic ultrapower gives exactly the situation described above. Of course, the same blueprint for
a generic large cardinal can generate axioms of wildly different consistency strength, depending how “close” is
V [G] from V (for example whether class forcing is permitted or not), how large (or small) we want it to be, and
even considering variations that stray from the pattern but are conceptually close.
The advantage of generic large cardinal embeddings is that their critical point can be small (for example
ω1), therefore they are a tool to transfer properties of large cardinals to “accessible” cardinals. This works best
for model-theoretical combinatorial properties, as elementary embeddings yield some reflection structure. For
example:
Definition 1.1 Given γ0, γ1, η0, η1 cardinals, we write (γ0, γ1)  (η0, η1) if the following holds: Given any
language L that contains, possibly among other, a distinguished relation symbol, every model U = (U,R, . . . )
in L such that |U | = γ0 and |R| = γ1 has an elementary submodel V = (V, S, . . . ) such that |V | = η0 and
|S| = η1.
For example, Chang’s Conjecture is (ℵ2,ℵ1)  (ℵ1,ℵ0). Moreover, a possible variation is to consider in the
definition two, three, etc. . . distinguished relation symbols.
Such arrow structure is common in very large cardinals. As a reference for all the large cardinal notions that
appear in this paper, we suggest Chapter 24 in [16].
Definition 1.2 A cardinal κ is huge iff there exists j : V ≺ M such that κ is the critical point of j and
M j(κ) ⊆M .
A cardinal κ is n-huge iff there exists j : V ≺ M such that κ is the critical point of j and Mκn ⊆ M , where
κ0 = κ and κn+1 = j(κn).
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If κ is huge and j witnesses it, then for any γ < κ, (j(κ), γ)  (κ, γ). Kunen exploited this to prove Chang’s
Conjecture via a collapse of a huge cardinal (into a generic huge cardinal). Laver remarked that the same collapse
can be used to prove (ℵn+2,ℵn+1)  (ℵn+1,ℵn) for any n ∈ ω. A more sophisticated collapse of a 2-huge
cardinal was used by Foreman in [11] to prove (ℵn+3,ℵn+2,ℵn+1)  (ℵn+2,ℵn+1,ℵn).
The dream is to push this to its limit: by a theorem of Silver (see [17] or [10]), if (. . . ,ℵ3,ℵ2,ℵ1) 
(. . . ,ℵ2,ℵ1,ℵ0), then ℵω is Jo´nsson. It is a long-standing open problem whether ℵω can be Jo´nsson, so proving
this would be highly desirable. Unfortunately, the “limit” of hugeness, i.e., the existence of a j : V ≺ M that
witnesses n-hugeness for every n simultaneously, is actually inconsistent (the same proof for the inconsistency
of the Reinhardt cardinal holds). Interestingly, also its generic counterpart is inconsistent: if j : V ≺M ⊆ V [G],
ℵω = supn∈ω κn, where κ0 = crt(j) < ℵω and κn+1 = j(κn), and Mℵω+1 ⊆ M , then ℵω+1 is Jo´nsson (see
Remark 2.10), but Shelah, using pcf theory, proved the following
Theorem 1.3 (Shelah, [18]) If 2ℵ0 ≤ ℵω+1, then ℵω+1 cannot be Jo´nsson.
Yet there are large cardinals between n-huge and Reinhardt:
Definition 1.4 • I1: there exists λ such that ∃j j : Vλ+1 ≺ Vλ+1;
• I0: there exists λ such that ∃j j : L(Vλ+1) ≺ L(Vλ+1), with crt(j) < λ.
I0 in particular is very fruitful, as under it the appropriate L(Vλ+1) has a structure that is very similar to the
structure of L(R) under the Axiom of Determinacy, in a way that it is still not completely understood: if AD
holds in L(R), then it is well-known that ω1 is measurable in L(R), but there are also many other measurable
cardinals above and the first cardinal “above” R is a limit of them [13]. The same holds in L(Vλ+1) under I0,
where λ+ is measurable and the first cardinal “above” Vλ+1 is a limit of measurable cardinals (see Lemma 22 in
[25] for the original and more general case, and Theorem 6.7 in [3] specifically for the I0 case).
Now, the “right” versions of generic I1 and generic I0 (see Definition 3.1) prove that ℵω is Jo´nsson. Moreover,
this paper presents other results, in line with the results about I0. In short, under generic I0 the structure of
L(P(ℵω)) is similar to the structure of L(R) under AD:
Theorem 4.1 Suppose that generic I0 holds at ℵω as witnessed by a forcing notion P. Then ℵω is Jo´nsson.
Moreover, in L(P(ℵω)) (see below for all the definitions):
• if ℵV [G]ω+1 = ℵω+1, then ℵω+1 is ω-strongly measurable and Jo´nsson;
• Θ is “inaccessible”, in the sense that it is regular and if α < Θ then there is a surjection from P(ℵω) to
P(α);
• if P is ω-closed, then Θ is limit of ω-strongly measurable cardinals that are measurable.
Some of these results are not new. A model where ℵω+1 is a measurable cardinal was already known:
Theorem 1.5 (Martin) AD implies ℵω+1 is measurable.
Theorem 1.6 (Apter, [1]) Suppose κ is 2λ-supercompact, with λ measurable. Then there is a model of ZF+
ℵω+1 is measurable.
New is the Jo´nsson-ness of ℵω+1,1 that goes strongly against Shelah’s Theorem 1.3, but this is not surprising,
as under generic I0 L(P(ℵω)) does not satisfy the Axiom of Choice, and pcf theory has not been fully developed
in this setting. But in fact, Theorem 4.1 goes very strongly against a more celebrated result of pcf theory:
Theorem 1.7 (Shelah, [19]) If ℵω is strong limit, then 2ℵω < ℵω4 .
In Theorem 4.1, Θ can be seen as a measure of 2ℵω in a choiceless setting: it is drastically larger than the cap
given by Shelah’s theorem, as it is an inaccessible limit of measurable cardinals. Generic I0 therefore not only
proves that ℵω is Jo´nsson, but provides a model where pcf theory fails radically.
In this paper no attempt is made to prove the consistency of generic I0. Currently it is not even known whether
generic 3-huge is consistent, as Foreman’s technique meets difficult technical obstacles in its generalization. This
is the graph indicating current knowledge, the arrows are implication of consistency, framed are the new results,
between parentheses the hypotheses that are inconsistent with ZFC:
1 It is well known in ZF+DC that every measurable cardinal is Ramsey [8] and every Ramsey cardinal is Jo´nsson [9], so Theorems 1.5
and 1.6 seem to prove that ℵω+1 is Jo´nsson. But is this true also in ZF?
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2 Preliminaries
This paper is about L(P(ℵω)). The assumption is that there is a V in which ZFC holds, and L(P(ℵω)) is
constructed inside V , as the smallest model of ZF that contains the “real” P(ℵω). The construction is the same
as L, but the starting point of the construction is L0(P(ℵω)) = P(ℵω), and the levels Lα(P(ℵω)) are defined as
expected.
Even if AC holds in V , it does not necessarily hold in L(P(ℵω)). Yet some relatively strong weak form of
choice is inherited:
Definition 2.1 DCλ: ∀X∀F : (X)<λ → P(X) \ {∅} ∃g : λ→ X ∀γ < λ g(γ) ∈ F (g  γ).
Remark 2.2 (ZF+ DCℵω ) L(P(ℵω))  DCℵω
Sketch of proof. The proof exploits the fact that there exists a surjection Φ : Ord×P(ℵω)  L(P(ℵω)):
DCℵω is true on P(ℵω) as it is true in V , on Ord because Ord is well-ordered, and Φ mixes the two to show
DCℵω in all L(P(ℵω)). For a similar proof in L(Vλ+1) see Lemma 5.10 in [3].
In a choiceless model the concept of cardinality is notoriously more complex. If L(P(ℵω)) 2 AC, then P(ℵω)
must not be well-orderable, otherwise the well-order would extend to all L(P(ℵω)). How to characterize the
cardinality of P(ℵω), then? In L(R) the classical way is to calculate the largeness of R via surjections instead of
the usual bijections, and we borrow the same idea. Surjections in this paper are always noted with the symbol.
Definition 2.3 ΘL(P(ℵω)) = {α : ∃pi ∈ L(P(ℵω)), pi : P(ℵω)  α}.
For the rest of the paper, ΘL(P(ℵω)) = Θ, as this will not create confusion. It is routine to prove that Θ is
regular in L(P(ℵω)), see for example Exercise 28.19 in [16].
The cardinal Θ is central in the study of the subsets of P(ℵω):
Lemma 2.4 (Folklore) If X ∈ L(P(ℵω)), X ⊆ P(ℵω), then X ∈ LΘ(P(ℵω)).
For this reason models like Lα(P(ℵω)) with α < Θ are also relevant in the study of the subsets of P(ℵω), as
they form a well-ordered set of approximations of LΘ(P(ℵω)). We say that an ordinal α < Θ is good iff every
element of Lα(P(ℵω)) is definable in Lα(P(ℵω)) from an element in P(ℵω). Good ordinals in L(Vλ+1) were
introduced by Laver in [14], and they are described in more detail in [6].
Lemma 2.5 There are unbounded good ordinals below Θ.
Sketch of proof. As in the L(Vλ+1) case, see [14]. The key point is that P(ℵω) can be considered closed by
ω-sequences.2
2 Actually, P(ℵω) can be considered closed under ℵω-sequences. Given a pairing function 〈·, ·〉 : ℵω × ℵω → ℵω , we code 〈Aα :
α < ℵω〉 as A∗ = {〈α, a〉 : a ∈ Aα}.
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Let β0 < Θ. Then there is a surjection h0 : P(ℵω)  Lβ0(P(ℵω)) in L(P(ℵω)). Therefore there must exist
a0 ∈ P(ℵω) such that h0 is definable from a0, and since h0 is codeable as a subset of P(ℵω) by Lemma 2.4
there exists β1 < Θ such that h0 ∈ Lβ1(P(ℵω)). By induction define hn, βn and an in the obvious way, and it
is routine to check that if βω is the supremum of the βn’s, then there exists h : P(ℵω)  Lβω (P(ℵω)) that is
definable from 〈a0, . . . , an, . . . 〉 ∈ P(ℵω), and therefore βω is good.
Large cardinals are also problematic in choiceless models. Fortunately, one definition of “measurable” can
be adopted unchanged in ZF: we say that κ is a measurable cardinal if there exists a κ-complete non-principal
ultrafilter on κ. But the study of L(R) under the Axiom of Determinacy indicates a more specific notion of
measurability, where the measure comes from the club filter.
Definition 2.6 Eκω = {η < κ : cof(η) = ω}.
Definition 2.7 (Woodin, Definition 198 in [24]) Let κ be an uncountable regular cardinal. We say that κ is
ω-strongly measurable if there exists γ < κ such that 2γ < κ and there does not exist a sequence 〈Sα : α < γ〉
of pairwise disjoint subsets of κ such that for each α < γ, Sα is stationary in Eκω .
Under the right conditions, an ω-strongly measurable is actually measurable:
Remark 2.8 (ZF+DCγ) If κ is ω-strongly measurable as witnessed by γ and the club filter on κ is κ-complete,
then κ is measurable.
Sketch of proof. Let γ < κ that witnesses that κ is strongly measurable. It is a standard procedure (see
Lemma 2.6 in [12]) to prove that if there does not exist a sequence 〈Sα : α < γ〉 of pairwise disjoint subsets of
κ such that for each α < γ, Sα is stationary in Eκω , then there exists a stationary set on which the club filter is an
ultrafilter:
If a stationary set cannot be split into two stationary sets (modulo a nonstationary set), then the club filter is
an ultrafilter on it. So suppose this never happens. Then by induction one can split κ in two stationary sets, then
in four, and so on. For the limit case, one uses DCγ , and after γ steps a partition 〈Sα : α < γ〉 of stationary sets
is created, and that is contradictory.
The club filter is κ-complete, so the remark follows.
Note that under ZF+ DC<κ the club filter on κ is κ-complete, therefore in that case it is a direct implication.
Another large cardinal that is expressible in a choiceless context is the Jo´nsson cardinal:
Definition 2.9 A cardinal κ is Jo´nsson iff any structure for a countable first-order language with domain of
cardinality κ has a proper elementary substructure with domain of the same cardinality.
This concept is tightly connected to generic large cardinals:
Remark 2.10 Let λ be a cardinal, G be generic for some forcing notion, j : V ≺ M ⊆ V [G], j(λ) = λ and
λM ⊆M , or just j′′λ ∈M . Then λ is Jo´nsson.
P r o o f. Suppose not. Then there exists some structure U = (U,∈, . . . ) such that |U | = λ and U has no
elementary substructure with domain U of cardinality λ. We can suppose that U ⊆ λ. By elementarity, since λ is
a fixed point of j, in M the same is true for j(U) = (j(U),∈, . . . ). But consider j′′U . We have that j′′U ∈ M ,
either because λM ⊆M or because j′′U = j(U) ∩ j′′λ ∈M , but j′′U ≺ j(U), this is a contradiction.
3 Definition of generic I0
Recall that I1 is the existence of an elementary embedding j : Vλ+1 ≺ Vλ+1 and that I0 is the existence of
an elementary embedding j : L(Vλ+1) ≺ L(Vλ+1) with critical point less than λ. By the proof of Reinhardt’s
inconsistency, in these cases λ must be a strong limit cardinal of cofinality ω, and j(λ) = λ. Moreover, under I0
it must be that L(Vλ+1) 2 AC.
As it is usual for generic large cardinals, the concept of “generic I0” is very vague. It implies that the generic
large cardinal should be similar to I0, i.e., the existence of some embedding j : L(P(κ)) ≺ L(P(κ))V [G], but this
is not enough to characterize it, as different κ’s and variations on how similar is V [G] to V produce drastically
different hypotheses. The first step will be to restrict ourselves to the case κ = ℵω , we are going to call it “generic
I0 holds at ℵω”. Then we indicate other properties that state that V [G] is close enough to V (the closer it is, the
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harder it is for it to be consistent, but on the other hand there are more interesting consequences). This choice has
of course some arbitrariness: it is possible for different kind of closures to be fruitful, so the definition in all its
details should be considered limited to this paper. But every point of the following definition has a reason to be
there for the purpose of the paper, and the rest of the section is dedicated to the explanation of such reasons.
Definition 3.1 Suppose GCH below ℵω . We say that generic I0 holds at ℵω if there exists a forcing notion
P ∈ L(P(ℵω)) and a G P-generic such that:
1. in L(P(ℵω)) there exists pi : P(ℵω)  P;
2. ℵω = ℵV [G]ω ;
3. every element of P(ℵω)V [G] has a name (coded) in P(ℵω);
4. in V [G] there exists j : L(P(ℵω)) ≺ L(P(ℵω))[G] with crt(j) < ℵω;
5. there is a P-term for HV [G](ℵω) and j  H(ℵω) : H(ℵω) ≺ HV [G](ℵω).
Point (1) implies that we can suppose that P ⊆ P(ℵω), and we will for the rest of the paper.
Point (4) needs to be discussed in more detail. We have two possible choices for the codomain of j:
• L(P(ℵω))V [G], that is L(P(ℵω)) as built inside the forcing extension;
• L(P(ℵω))[G], that is the forcing extension of L(P(ℵω)), or the class of the elements of V [G] that have a
name in L(Vλ+1).
Definition 3.1(2) and (3) provide different ways to describe these two models. First of all, by Definition 3.1(2)
P(ℵω)V [G] = PV [G](ℵV [G]ω ) = PV [G](ℵω).3
Then Definition 3.1(3) says that P(ℵω)V [G] ⊆ P(ℵω)[G], therefore PV [G](ℵω) = PP(ℵω)[G](ℵω). In other
words, all the subsets of ℵω in V [G] are already in P(ℵω)[G], so for example PL(P(ℵω))[G](ℵω) = PV [G](ℵω).
But then L(P(ℵω))[G] is a ZF-model that contains PV [G](ℵω), therefore trivially
(L(P(ℵω)))V [G] = L(PV [G](ℵω)) ⊆ L(P(ℵω))[G].
Could these two models be equal? The key object is P(ℵω): it is trivially in L(P(ℵω))[G], but not necessarily
in L(P(ℵω))V [G]. But this is a consequence of generic I0 at ℵω:
Lemma 3.2 Suppose that generic I0 holds at ℵω and let P, G witness that. Then (L(P(ℵω)))V [G] =
L(P(ℵω))[G].
P r o o f. NaturallyL(P(ℵω))  V = L(P(ℵω)), therefore by elementarityL(P(ℵω))[G]  V = L(P(j(ℵω))).
By Definition 3.1(2) j(ℵω) = ℵω , soL(P(ℵω))[G]  V = L(P(ℵω)). By Definition 3.1(3)PL(P(ℵω))[G](ℵω) =
PV [G](ℵω), therefore
L(P(ℵω))[G] = L(PV [G](ℵω)) = (L(P(ℵω)))V [G]
The proof also provides that L(P(ℵω))V [G] = L(P(ℵω))L(P(ℵω))[G], and for better readability we will use
the first notation even when we mean the second one.
We can try to be even more precise: any element of L(P(ℵω))V [G] has a name in L(P(ℵω)), but we can do
this level by level. It is a calculation that if P ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω)) and σ ∈ Lη(P(ℵω)) is a P-name, then Def(σG) has
a name in Lmax{γ,η}+3(P(ℵω)).4 Now, PV [G](ℵω) has a name in Lω(P(ℵω)), so by induction Lδ(P(ℵω))V [G]
has a name in Lγ+δ+n(P(ℵω)) for some n ∈ ω. With a similar calculation, we find that if x is definable over a
4 For example, {〈τ, 1〉 : dom(τ) ⊆ dom(σ), ∃ϕ ∈ Fml ∃τ1, . . . τn ∈ dom(σ) ∀p ∈ P ∀pi ∈ dom(σ) 〈pi, p〉 ∈ τ ↔ p  σ 
ϕ(pi, σ, τ1, . . . , τn)}.
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model σG, with σ ∈ Lη(P(ℵω)), then x has a name in Lmax{γ,η}+3(P(ℵω)),5 so if x ∈ Lδ+1(P(ℵω))V [G], then
x has a name in Lγ+δ+n(P(ℵω)) for some n ∈ ω. In other words, for any δ ordinal, there is a n ∈ ω such that
Lδ+1(P(ℵω))V [G] ⊆ Lγ+δ+n(P(ℵω))[G].
On the other hand, suppose that η is such that P(ℵω), G ∈ Lη(P(ℵω))V [G]. Then any element in Lδ(P(ℵω)),
P-names included, will be inLmax{δ,η}(P(ℵω))V [G], therefore for any δ ordinalLδ(P(ℵω))[G] ⊆ Lmax{δ,η}+1(P(ℵω))V [G].
We proved the following:
Lemma 3.3 Suppose that generic I0 holds at ℵω and let P, G witness that. Let γ < Θ be such that
P, P(ℵω), G ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω))V [G]. Then for any γ < α limit ordinal, Lα(P(ℵω))V [G] = Lα(P(ℵω))[G].
Lemma 3.2 shows that the definition of generic I0 with L(P(ℵω))[G] implies the one with (L(P(ℵω)))V [G].
It is not much stronger, for example assuming ω-closure is enough to make them equivalent:
Lemma 3.4 Let P be an ω-closed forcing notion on L(P(ℵω)) that with G P-generic satisfies Definition
3.1(1), (2), (3). Then (L(P(ℵω)))V [G] = L(P(ℵω))[G].
P r o o f. For the case L(Vλ+1), this is Corollary 3.8 in [6]. As noted, we just need to prove that P(ℵω) ∈
(L(P(ℵω)))V [G]. Let G be generic for P. By Definition 3.1(1), we can suppose G ⊆ P(ℵω). As P is ω-closed,
we can define
P(ℵω) = {a ∈ PV [G](ℵω) : ∀n ∈ ω a ∩ ℵn ∈ V }.
This is because if a ∩ ℵn = an ∈ V , then 〈an : n ∈ ω〉 ∈ V , and a =
⋃
n∈ω an ∈ V . So L(P(ℵω))[G] ⊆
L(P(ℵω)))V [G].
Theorem 8.8 in [3] proves that in the L(Vλ+1) case the ω-closure is necessary and sufficient.
Open Problem 3.1 Let P be a forcing notion on L(P(ℵω)) that satisfies Definition 3.1(1), (2) and (3), and
such that (L(P(ℵω)))V [G] = L(P(ℵω))[G]. Must P be ω-closed?
There are therefore two approaches for defining generic I0. One is to ask for P to be ω-closed: this will
give the full results of Theorem 4.1, and because of Lemma 3.4 the codomain of the generic embedding can be
just L(P(ℵω))V [G]. The other is to forgo ω-closure, but then adding the (potentially) stronger condition of the
codomain of the embedding to be L(P(ℵω))[G]. This will prove the first two points of Theorem 4.1. Why are
we using this stronger version of generic I0, even if it would seem that the weaker version is closer to the spirit
of generic large cardinals? It is just a technical matter: we are proving now that, thanks to the lifting lemma,
L(P(ℵω))[G] maintains the “reflection structure” of L(P(ℵω)), and this is central to the proofs. For this paper,
we are not choosing one of the two approaches, especially in light of the fact that the Open Problem 3.1 would
prove that the two approaches are the same.
Lemma 3.5 Suppose generic I0 at ℵω , and let P, G witness it. Let γ be such that P, G, PV (ℵω) ∈
Lγ(P(ℵω))V [G]. Then for any γ < α, β limit ordinals, Lα(P(ℵω)) ≺ Lβ(P(ℵω)) iff
L(P(ℵω))[G]  Lα(P(ℵω)) ≺ Lβ(P(ℵω)).
P r o o f. From left to right: By the usual lifting lemma,6 as P ∈ Lα(P(ℵω)),Lα(P(ℵω))[G] ≺ Lβ(P(ℵω))[G].
But by Lemma 3.3 Lα(P(ℵω))[G] = Lα(P(ℵω))V [G] and Lβ(P(ℵω))[G] = Lβ(P(ℵω))V [G], so
V [G]  Lα(P(ℵω)) ≺ Lβ(P(ℵω)).
but then by absoluteness one direction is proved.
On the other hand, suppose that
L(P(ℵω))[G]  Lα(P(ℵω)) ≺ Lβ(P(ℵω)).
5 For example {〈pi, p〉 ∈ dom(σ)× P : p  pi ∈ σ ∧ σ  ϕ(pi, τ1, . . . , τn)}
6 It says that if j :M ≺ N , P ∈M , G P-generic, H j(P)-generic and j′′G ⊆ H , then j extends to M [G] ≺ N [H]
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As before, this is equivalent to Lα(P(ℵω))V [G] ≺ Lβ(P(ℵω))V [G]. Let X = P(ℵω). As X ∈ Lα(P(ℵω))V [G],
by absoluteness of constructibility and Lemma 3.3,
Lα(X) = (L(X))
Lα(P(ℵω))[G],
and the same holds for β. So for any formula ϕ and any a1, . . . , an ∈ Lα(X),
Lα(X)  ϕ(a1, . . . , an) iff
iff Lα(P(ℵω))[G]  (L(X)  ϕ(a1, . . . , an))
iff Lβ(P(ℵω))[G]  (L(X)  ϕ(a1, . . . , an))
iff Lβ(X)  ϕ(a1, . . . , an).
All the other requirements have the effect of making the generic I0 more similar to the real one: for example,
if j : L(Vλ+1) ≺ L(Vλ+1) then it must be that j(λ) = λ, and this is a fundamental point for I0, and because of
point (2) j(ℵω) = ℵω (this will also be crucial to prove the Jo´nsson-ness of key cardinals). Point (1) gives even
more:
Lemma 3.6 Suppose generic I0 at ℵω . Then ΘV [G] = Θ and j(Θ) = Θ.
P r o o f. Let X = P(ℵω). Suppose not, so there exist a p ∈ P and a name τ such that p  τ : Xˆ → Θˆ.
Then define (in V ) e : P × P(ℵω) → Θ as e(q, a) = α iff q  τ(a) = α. But then e is a surjection: for every
β < Θ there exist a ∈ P(ℵω) and q ≤ p such that q  τ(a) = β. By Definition 3.1(1), this induces a surjection
e+ : P(ℵω)  Θ, contradiction.
I0 is a strengthening of I1, that is j : Vλ+1 ≺ Vλ+1: as already noticed, point (3) of the definition reflects this,
as it implies that j(P(ℵω)) = P(ℵω)L(P(ℵω))[G] = P(ℵω)[G], and therefore j  P(ℵω) : P(ℵω) ≺ P(ℵω)[G],
that is a nice definition for generic I1. Finally, point (5) is there to give the necessary amenability for j, that in I0
is for free:
Lemma 3.7 Suppose that generic I0 holds at ℵω and let G and j witness that. Then for unbounded (for all)
α < Θ, j  Lα(P(ℵω)) ∈ L(P(ℵω))[G].
P r o o f. By Lemma 2.5, we can assume that α is good. Then j is defined only by its behavior on P(ℵω), that
in turn is defined by its behavior on H(ℵω), because
j(a) = j(
⋃
n∈ω
(a ∩ ℵn)) =
⋃
n∈ω
j(a ∩ ℵn).
By Definition 3.1(5) j  H(ℵω) ∈ L(P(ℵω))[G], and therefore this is true also for j  Lα(P(ℵω)).
4 Consequences of generic I0
Let us recall the theorem that summarizes the consequences of generic I0 at ℵω:
Theorem 4.1 Suppose that generic I0 holds at ℵω as witnessed by a forcing notion P. Then ℵω is Jo´nsson.
Moreover, in L(P(ℵω)) (see below for all the definitions):
• if ℵV [G]ω+1 = ℵω+1, then ℵω+1 is ω-strongly measurable and Jo´nsson;
• Θ is “inaccessible”, in the sense that it is regular and if α < Θ then there is a surjection from P(ℵω) to
P(α);
• if P is ω-closed, then Θ is limit of ω-strongly measurable cardinals that are measurable.
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By Remark 2.10 and Lemma 3.7 it is immediate to see that ℵω , and ℵω+1 when it is a fixed point, are Jo´nsson
in L(P(ℵω)). But the definition of ℵω Jo´nsson involves only elements in P(ℵω), therefore ℵω is Jo´nsson also in
V .
Proposition 4.2 Suppose that I0 holds at ℵω , witnessed by G, j. If ℵV [G]ω+1 = ℵω+1, then ℵω+1 is ω-strongly
measurable in L(P(ℵω)).
It will be witnessed by γ = crt(j). As L(P(ℵω))  DCℵω by Remark 2.2, this will imply that ℵω+1 is
measurable in L(P(ℵω)) by Remark 2.8.
P r o o f. We prove thatEℵω+1ω cannot be partitioned in crt(j) stationary sets. As ℵω is strong limit, this suffices
to prove the Proposition. Suppose not, and fix 〈Sα : α < crt(j)〉 a partition of Eℵω+1ω in crt(j) stationary sets.
Then
j(〈Sα : α < crt(j)〉) = 〈Tα : α < j(crt(j))〉
is a partition of (Eℵω+1ω )V [G] into j(crt(j)) stationary sets. Consider D = {α < ℵω+1 : j(α) = α}. By Lemma
3.7, as j  Lℵω+1(P(ℵω)) ∈ L(P(ℵω))[G], D ∈ L(P(ℵω))[G]. As PV [G](ℵω) can be considered closed under
ℵω-sequences, ℵV [G]ω+1 is regular, and therefore D is an ω-club of ℵω+1 = ℵV [G]ω+1 , so there exists η ∈ D ∩ Tcrt(j).
But there must be some α such that η ∈ Sα, and so η = j(η) ∈ Tj(α), contradiction.
The rest of Theorem 4.1 deals with ordinals under Θ. The following lemma will be therefore very useful:
Proposition 4.3 {α < Θ : j(α) = α} is cofinal in Θ.
P r o o f. Let
U = {X ⊆ P(ℵω) : X ∈ L(P(ℵω)), (H(ℵω), j  H(ℵω)) ∈ j(X)}.
It is a L(P(ℵω))-ultrafilter. By Definition 3.1(5) U is definable in L(P(ℵω))[G], as a class, in the sense that given
an X ⊆ P(ℵω), L(P(ℵω))[G] “knows” whether X ∈ U or not, but U /∈ L(P(ℵω))[G]. The proof works as
Lemma 5 in [25], in that we prove that the embedding j is close enough to a (generic) ultrapower embedding, that
is easier to work with. The main innovation in [25] is the proof of Łos’ Theorem: in L(Vλ+1) there is no Axiom
of Choice, so it must be proven from scratch. Here the situation is the same, but the proof of Łos’ Theorem is
slightly different, as here the same “reflection trick” is not possible, and we must create one ad hoc.
The obstacle to prove Łos’ Theorem without AC is in proving that if
{z ∈ P(ℵω) : L(P(ℵω))  ∃y ϕ(z, f1(x), . . . , fn(x))} ∈ U,
then there exists a function g : P(ℵω)→ L(P(ℵω)) such that
{x ∈ Vλ+1 : L(P(ℵω))  ϕ(g(x), f1(x), . . . , fn(x))} ∈ U.
This is equivalent to prove that for each f : P(ℵω) → L(P(ℵω)) \ ∅ there exists a g : P(ℵω) → L(P(ℵω)) \ ∅
such that {x ∈ P(ℵω) : g(x) ∈ f(x)} ∈ U . Since in L(P(ℵω)) everything is definable from an ordinal and
elements in P(ℵω), it suffices to prove it for f such that for any a ∈ P(ℵω), f(a) ⊆ P(ℵω). For more details
about this procedure, see Lemma 5.11 in [3].
Claim 4.4 For any b ∈ P(ℵω), there exists a g : P(ℵω) → L(P(ℵω)) \ ∅ such that j(g)((H(ℵω), j 
H(ℵω))) = b.
Note that (H(ℵω), j  H(ℵω)) can be coded as an element of P(ℵω)V [G], therefore the claim is well-
formulated.
Proof of Claim. Let N ⊆ H(ℵω). Then we define P(ℵω)N in the same way we define P(ℵω) from H(ℵω):
P(ℵω)N = {
⋃
n∈ω
an : (∀n an ⊆ ℵn ∧ an ∈ N) ∧ ∀n ≤ m an = am ∩ ℵn}.
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As in Lemma 3.7, if we have a k : N ≺ H(ℵω), then it naturally extends to kN : P(ℵω)N → P(ℵω), with
kN (
⋃
n∈ω an) =
⋃
n∈ω k(an). If we do not known anything else about k, it could be the case that kN is not
elementary.
Let
g(x) =
{
c if x = (N, k), N ⊆ H(ℵω), ∃Z ⊆ P(ℵω)N kN  Z : Z ≺ P(ℵω), k(c) = b
0 otherwise.
Then
j(g)(x) =

c if x = (N, k), N ⊆ HV [G](ℵω), ∃Z ⊆ (P(ℵω)N )V [G]
kN  Z : Z ≺ PV [G](ℵω), k(c) = j(b)
0 otherwise.
If P is ω-closed, then (P(ℵω)H(ℵω))V [G] = P(ℵω), and therefore it is immediate to see that (H(ℵω), j 
H(ℵω)) satisfies the conditions in the definition of j(g), lettingZ = (P(ℵω)N )V [G], and therefore j(g)((H(ℵω), j 
H(ℵω))) = b, because j is injective. If P is not ω-closed, then possibly in P(ℵω)H(ℵω) calculated in V [G] more
elements can appear than the ones in P(ℵω), as there can be, in V [G], ω-sequences of elements in H(ℵω) that
are not in V . But anyway P(ℵω) ∈ L(P(ℵω))[G], so we can just let Z = P(ℵω) ⊆ (P(ℵω)H(ℵω))V [G], and
then again j(g)((H(ℵω), j  H(ℵω))) = b.
In particular, b can be an element of j(f)((H(ℵω), j  H(ℵω))), therefore Łos’ Theorem is proved.
The ultrapower construction therefore does yield an elementary embedding, we call it k, and the following
diagram commutes:
L(P(ℵω)) L(P(ℵω))[G]
Ult(L(P(ℵω)), U)
j
k h
where h([f ]) = j(f)((H(ℵω), j  H(ℵω))). By Claim 4.4, h” Ult(L(P(ℵω)), U) ⊇ P(ℵω), and therefore
the critical point of h is bigger than Θ, because the critical point of h is not in the image of h. Therefore j(Θ) =
k(Θ) and j  LΘ(P(ℵω)) = k  LΘ(P(ℵω)). Also, by elementarity, Ult(L(P(ℵω)), U)  V = L(k(P(ℵω))).
As k(P(ℵω)) = j(P(ℵω)) = PV [G](ℵω), this means that Ult(L(P(ℵω)), U) = L(PV [G](ℵω)) = L(P(ℵω))[G].
Now it is the almost the same as [25]. It is standard to prove that every strong limit cardinal with large cofinality
is a fixed point of k, so the class of fixed points I is cofinal in Ord, and therefore every element of L(P(ℵω)) is
defined from elements of I ∪P(ℵω): if not, the inverse of the collapse of the Skolem closure of I ∪P(ℵω) would
be a non-trivial elementary embedding, but the critical point would be so large that it would be in I , and that is
a contradiction. This argument would hold also in L(PV [G](ℵω)), so any element in L(PV [G](ℵω)) is defined
from elements of I ∪ PV [G](ℵω).
So any ordinal β < Θ is definable from some elements of I ∪ P(ℵω). Pick β so that P, P(ℵω), G ∈
Lβ(P(ℵω))V [G]. Let i0, . . . , in ∈ I such that β and P are definable from P(ℵω) ∪ {i0, . . . , in}. Let Z be the
Skolem closure of {i0, . . . , in} ∪ P(ℵω). In particular β, P ∈ Z. Let α = supZ, so that β < α.
By the lifting lemma and the fact that P ∈ Z we have that Z[G] ≺ L(P(ℵω))[G] = L(PV [G](ℵω)), and also
Z[G] contains P(ℵω)[G] = PV [G](ℵω) and {i0, . . . , in}. But, by elementarity, k(Z) is the Skolem closure of
{i0, . . . , in}∪PV [G](ℵω) inL(PV [G](ℵω)), therefore k(Z) ⊆ Z[G]. But then k(α) = sup(k(Z)) ≤ supZ[G] ≤
supZ = α, so k(α) = α.
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Therefore the fixed points of k are cofinal in Θ. As
j  LΘ(P(ℵω)) = k  LΘ(P(ℵω)),
also the fixed points of j are cofinal in Θ.
Theorem 4.5 Θ is “inaccessible” in L(P(ℵω)), in the sense that it is regular and if α < Θ then there is a
surjection from P(ℵω) to P(α).
Lemma 4.6 (Weak Coding Lemma) Suppose generic I0 for ℵω , witnessed by j, P. Then in L(P(ℵω)), for
all κ < Θ and for all pi : P(ℵω)  κ ∃γ < Θ such that ∀X ⊆ P(ℵω) if pi′′X is cofinal in κ, then ∃Y ⊆ X ,
Y ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω)) such that pi′′Y is cofinal in κ.
P r o o f. We introduce some notation, to make the proof more readable.
If X ⊆ P(ℵω), X ∈ L(P(ℵω)), we say that X is pi-unbounded (in κ) if pi′′X is cofinal in κ. So the
Weak Coding Lemma says that for any pi surjection of P(ℵω) to some ordinal there exists a γ such that any
pi-unbounded set has a subset that is in Lγ(P(ℵω)) (therefore less complex) that it is still pi-unbounded.
Suppose not, i.e., there exist κ, pi : P(ℵω)  κ, such that ∀γ < Θ ∃X ⊆ P(ℵω) pi-unbounded such that
∀Y ⊆ X , Y ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω)) Y is pi-bounded. We just write NWCLκ to indicate this and underline the role of κ.
Now we want to fix κ.
Claim 4.7 Let pi : P(ℵω)  κ, letX ⊆ P(ℵω) pi-unbounded. Then if there exists a Y ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω))[G], with
γ limit and P ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω))[G], such that Y is pi-unbounded and Y ⊆ X , then there exists Y ∗ ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω))
that satisfies the same.
P r o o f. Let p ∈ G and τ ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω)) such that p  τ = Y ∧ Y ⊆ X . Define
Y ∗ = {a ∈ P(ℵω) : ∃q ≤ p q  a ∈ τ}.
Then Y ∗ ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω)) and Y ⊆ Y ∗ ⊆ X , therefore pi′′Y ∗ ⊇ pi′′Y is cofinal in κ.
An immediate consequence of Claim 4.7 is that if NWCLκ does not hold in L(P(ℵω))[G], then it does not
hold directly in L(P(ℵω)): Suppose NWCLκ does not hold in L(P(ℵω))[G] and it holds in L(P(ℵω)). Then
there exists pi : P(ℵω)  κ, such that ∀γ < Θ ∃X ⊆ P(ℵω) pi-unbounded such that ∀Y ⊆ X , Y ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω)),
Y is pi-bounded. Fix one of these pi. We can trivially extend pi to pi∗ : PV [G](ℵω)  κ. Then, in L(P(ℵω))[G],
there exists a γ such that all the pi∗-unbounded sets have a pi∗-unbounded subset in Lγ(P(ℵω))V [G]. We can
choose γ so that it satisfies Lemma 3.3. Let X ⊆ P(ℵω) in L(P(ℵω)) that is pi-unbounded but such that all its
subsets in Lγ(P(ℵω)) are pi-bounded. Then, in Lγ(P(ℵω))[G], X is also pi∗-unbounded, so there is a Y ⊆ X ,
Y ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω))V [G] = Lγ(P(ℵω))[G] pi∗-unbounded and therefore pi-unbounded. Contradiction by Claim 4.7.
Now let κ0 be the least such that NWCLκ0 holds.
Claim 4.8 j(κ0) = κ0.
P r o o f. Suppose not, then κ0 < j(κ0). As j(κ0) is minimal in L(P(ℵω))[G], this means that NWCLκ0 does
not hold in L(P(ℵω))[G]. But then by Claim 4.7 it does not hold in L(P(ℵω)). Contradiction.
Now let us drop the superscript and write NWCL instead of NWCLκ0 . The free parameters in NWCL are ω
and κ0, all fixed points of j. By definition of κ0, NWCL is true. As all the sets involved are subsets of P(ℵω), or
codeable as such, NWCL is true in LΘ(P(ℵω)).
Let
Γ = {α < Θ : Lα(P(ℵω)) ≺ LΘ(P(ℵω))}.
Then by Lemma 3.5 Γ and ΓL(P(ℵω))[G] have the same tail. Using Lemma 4.3, fix a δ < Θ, δ > κ0 that is a fixed
point of j, such that j  H(ℵω) ∈ Lδ(P(ℵω))V [G], and so that
Γ ∩ [δ,Θ] = ΓL(P(ℵω))[G] ∩ [δ,Θ] = Γ′.
Fix an enumeration of Γ′ = 〈γα : α < Θ〉. Note that Γ′ = j(Γ′) and j(γα) = γj(α).
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As NWLC is true in LΘ(P(ℵω)), by elementarity it is also true in all Lγ(P(ℵω)), for γ ∈ Γ′. Therefore
NWLC is true in Lγcrt(j)+1(P(ℵω)). Fix pi : P(ℵω)  κ0, and let X ⊆ P(ℵω) be pi-unbounded and such that all
Y ⊆ X , Y ∈ Lγcrt(j)(P(ℵω)) are pi-bounded, with pi,X ∈ Lγcrt(j)+1(P(ℵω)). Then j(X) is j(pi)-unbounded,
and all the Y ⊆ X , Y ∈ Lγj(crt(j))(P(ℵω))V [G] are j(pi)-bounded. But consider j“X: it is a subset of j(X),
it is defined from X and j  H(ℵω), and therefore is in Lγcrt(j)+1+1(P(ℵω))V [G]. As crt(j) + 1 < j(crt(j)),
γcrt(j)+1 < γj(crt(j)) and therefore γcrt(j)+1 + 1 ≤ γj(crt(j)), so j“X ∈ Lγj(crt(j))(P(ℵω))V [G]. But j′′pi′′X =
j(pi)′′(j′′X) and j′′κ0 is cofinal in κ0, therefore j“X is j(pi)-unbounded, contradiction.
Lemma 4.9 (Coding Lemma) Suppose generic I0 for ℵω , witnessed by P. Then in L(P(ℵω)), for all κ < Θ
and for all pi : P(ℵω)  κ ∃γ0 such that ∀X ⊆ P(ℵω) ∃Y ⊆ X , Y ∈ Lγ0(P(ℵω)) such that pi′′X = pi′′Y .
P r o o f. Proving the Coding Lemma from the Weak Coding Lemma is standard (see for example the proof of
Lemma 22 in [25], pages 149–150), and does not need generic I0.
Let pi : P(ℵω)  κ, and suppose by induction that the Coding Lemma holds for all pi′ : P(ℵω)  α with
α < κ. Let τ be a bijection between P(ℵω) and P(ℵω) × P(ℵω), and let pi∗ : P(ℵω)  κ be pi ◦ τ1 (therefore
if τ(x) = (a, b) then pi∗(x) = pi(a)). For any α < κ, let piα : P(ℵω)  α be
piα(x) =
{
pi(x) if pi(x) < α
0 otherwise
Let γα witness the Coding Lemma for piα and fix a γκ that witnesses the Weak Coding Lemma for pi∗. Let β0 =
supα≤κ γα: As Θ is regular, β0 < Θ, therefore there exists ρ : P(ℵω)  Lβ0(P(ℵω)). Let ρ, τ ∈ Lβ(P(ℵω)).
Then we claim that β + 1 witnesses the Coding Lemma for pi.
Let X ⊆ P(ℵω). Consider
A = {x ∈ P(ℵω) : ρ(τ2(x)) witnesses the Coding Lemma for pipi∗(x), X}.
In other words, A is the set of all (α, Y ) such that Y satisfies the Coding Lemma for piα and X , but coded as
a subset of P(ℵω). Since by induction for every α < κ there is a Y ∈ Lβ0(P(ℵω)) that satisfies the Coding
Lemma for piα and X , pi∗[A] = κ, and by the Weak Coding Lemma there exists a B ∈ Lγκ(P(ℵω)), B ⊆ A
such that B is pi∗-unbounded. Then let Y =
⋃{ρ(τ2(x)) : x ∈ B}. Clearly Y ∈ Lβ+1(P(ℵω)).
Suppose there exists an x ∈ X such that pi(x) = γ. We must find a y ∈ Y such that pi(y) = γ. As B is
pi∗-unbounded, there exists an α > γ and a z ∈ B such that pi∗(z) = α, and therefore pi(x) = piα(x). AsB ⊆ A,
this means that ρ(τ2(z)) witnesses the Coding Lemma for pipi∗(z) = piα and X . Therefore pi′′αX = pi
′′
αρ(τ2(z))
and there exists a y ∈ ρ(τ2(z)) such that pi(y) = piα(y) = γ.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Let α < Θ and A ⊆ α. Fix a pi : P(ℵω)  α, pi ∈ Lβ(P(ℵω)) and let γ ≥ β witness
the Coding Lemma for pi. Let X = pi−1[A]. Then, by the Coding Lemma, there exists Y ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω)), Y ⊆ X
such that pi′′Y = pi′′X = A. But then A ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω)).
Therefore P(α) ⊆ Lγ(P(ℵω)), and as there is a surjection from P(ℵω) to Lγ(P(ℵω)), the theorem is proved.
Theorem 4.10 If P is ω-closed, then Θ is limit of ω-strongly measurable cardinals that are measurable.
P r o o f. Fix an α such that j(α) = α and such that Lemma 3.3 holds, and let κ be the least ordinal bigger
than α such that Lκ(P(ℵω)) ≺1 LΘ(P(ℵω)). Then, using Lemma3.5, j(κ) = κ. We will prove that κ is an
ω-strongly measurable cardinal and that is measurable, and by Lemma 4.3 the arbitrarity of α will prove the
theorem,
Define ΘLκ(P(ℵω)) as the supremum of the ordinals α such that there is a surjection ρ : P(ℵω)  α such
that {(a, b) : ρ(a) < ρ(b)} ∈ Lκ(P(ℵω)). By elementarity ΘLκ(P(ℵω)) = κ. It is now tempting to dump all
the information we have about Θ on κ, for example that Θ is regular or the Coding Lemma itself. But one must
be cautious: Θ is not an element of LΘ(P(ℵω)), therefore not all properties can be reflected (not regularity, for
example), and the Coding Lemma has too high complexity. But it is possible to prove both, thanks to the analysis
of stable ordinals that has been brought forward for L(R).
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Like inL(R), there exists a Σ1(α) partial map fromP(ℵω) toLκ(P(ℵω)): AsLκ(P(ℵω))  V = HODP(ℵω),
it is possible to build Σ1 partial Skolem functions inside Lκ(P(ℵω)), defining for any Σ1 formula and any
a ∈ P(ℵω) hφ,a(x) as the smallest element in ODa that satisfies ϕ(x). The closure of P(ℵω) ∪ α under such
Skolem functions is a Σ1 elementary substructure of LΘ(P(ℵω)), and by condensation its collapse is some
Lγ(P(ℵω)), with γ > α. But κ was the least one, so γ = κ. Therefore every element of Lκ(P(ℵω)) is image of
the collapse of some Skolem function, and coding ϕ, a and x in a unique element of P(ℵω) we have the Σ1(α)
partial surjection.
In the same way, more carefully, it is possible for any β < κ to find in Lκ(P(ℵω)) a total surjection from
P(ℵω) to Lβ(P(ℵω)). Therefore, κ is actually the supremum of the∆21(α) prewellorderings of P(ℵω) (the proof
is the same as in Lemma 1.11 and Lemma 1.12 in [23]).
Lemma 4.11 Let ρ : P(ℵω) → Lκ(P(ℵω)) be a Σ1(α) partial map. Then for every Z ⊆ dom(ρ) such that
Z ∈ Lκ(P(ℵω)), ρ  Z is bounded.
P r o o f. Let Z ⊆ dom(ρ), Z ∈ Lκ(P(ℵω)). Then Z is actually∆21(α) from P(ℵω). We can build a∆21(α)
prewellordering on Z, connecting to any z ∈ Z the least ordinal in the constructive hierarchy where ρ(z) appears.
Then ρ  Z cannot be unbounded, otherwise there would be a∆21(α) prewellordering of length κ.
We proved the following:
Lemma 4.12 There exists a partial ρ : P(ℵω)  Lκ(P(ℵω)), Σ1(α)-definable from P(ℵω), such that on
every Z ⊆ dom(ρ), Z ∈ Lκ(P(ℵω)) we have that ρ is bounded.
In a similar fashion, we can prove that cof(κ) > ℵω: Suppose that there exists a cofinal sequence of length
< ℵω in κ. Then using DCℵω for every element of the sequence one can choose a∆21(α) prewellordering with
such length, and glue them all together to form a∆21(α) prewellordering of length κ, that is contradictory. With
the same reasoning the cofinality of κ is larger then ℵω also in L(P(ℵω))V [G].
Now the proof that κ is ω-strongly measurable is as in Proposition 4.2. Consider Eκω and let 〈Sα : α < crt(j)〉
a partition of Eκω in stationary subsets. Let
〈Tα : α < j(crt(j))〉 = j(〈Sα : α < crt(j)〉).
Let D = {α < κ : cof(α) = ω, j(α) = α}. Then by Definition 3.1(5) D ∈ L(P(ℵω))[G] and D is naturally
closed on Eκω . As (cof(κ) > ω)
L(P(ℵω))[G], D is unbounded. Then D is in the club filter of κ, and the proof is
as before.
We should prove now that κ is measurable. Remark 2.8 does not help, as we do not have enough Dependent
Choice to prove that the club filter F on κ is κ-complete. In the L(Vλ+1) case (see Lemma 22 in [25]) this was
proved defining F0 as the filter of the fixed points of the elementary embeddings from Lκ(Vλ+1) to itself: then
F0 ⊆ F on Eκω , F0 is an ultrafilter on a stationary (usual proof), and it is easier to prove that F0 is κ-complete.
Unfortunately, this does not work in this setting: the problem is that in the I0 case F0 is both in the domain
and the codomain of the j that witnesses I0, and it is a fixed point, but in the generic I0 case, instead, the filter
F0 = {k : Lκ(P(ℵω)) ≺ Lκ(P(ℵω))[G]}
exists only in V [G], and not in V . The objective, therefore, is to find a filter F ′0 ⊆ F in V such that F0 ⊆ j(F ′0) ⊆
F , and proving that there exists a stationary set such that F ′0 is an ultrafilter on it. Then the Coding Lemma will
be used instead of DCκ to prove that F ′0 is κ-complete, and this will prove that F is κ-complete. The steps of the
proof are therefore the following:
• Proving the Coding Lemma in Lκ(P(ℵω));
• Proving that there is no partition of κ in crt(j) F ′0-positive sets;
• Proving that F ′0 ⊆ F on Eκω;
• Proving that F ′0 is κ-complete.
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The Weak Coding Lemma inLκ(P(ℵω)) does not follow from elementarity, but it can be re-proved in the exact
same way as in Lemma 4.6: It is essential that ΘLκ(P(ℵω)) = κ, so that γα is defined, and since cof(κ) > ℵω the
sequence of γα is longer than ℵω , and therefore the contradiction with the existence of γcrt(j) holds.
Lemma 4.13 κ is regular in L(P(ℵω)).
P r o o f. It is similar to the proof of cof(κ) > ℵω , using the Weak Coding Lemma instead of DCℵω . Let
β = cof(κ) and pick a f : β → κ cofinal in κ. Suppose that β < κ. As ΘLκ(P(ℵω)) = κ, there exists a surjection
pi : P(ℵω)  β, with pi ∈ Lκ(P(ℵω)). Define pi′ : P(ℵω)  β as pi′(〈a, b〉) = pi(a) and let γ witness the Weak
Coding Lemma in Lκ(P(ℵω)) for pi′. Then let
A = {〈a, b〉 : b ∈ dom(ρ) ∧ ρ(b) = f(pi(a))}.
By the Weak Coding Lemma, there exists B ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω)), B ⊆ A such that B is pi′-unbounded. By definition,
this means that pi′′(B)0 (the image under pi of the projection of B in the first coordinate), is unbounded in β. Let
Z = (B)1 = {b : ∃a ∈ P(ℵω), 〈a, b〉 ∈ B}.
Then also Z is in Lγ(P(ℵω)). But f ◦ pi“(B)0 ⊆ ρ′′Z, and as pi′′(B)0 is cofinal in β, ρ“Z is unbounded in κ,
and this contradicts its boundedness as in Lemma 4.12.
Again, the proof of the Coding Lemma works now in Lκ(P(ℵω)), the key points being that the Weak Coding
Lemma holds in Lκ(P(ℵω)) and that κ = ΘLκ(P(ℵω)) is regular (so that induction works). We have proved:
Lemma 4.14 (Coding Lemma in Lκ(P(ℵω))) In Lκ(P(ℵω)), for all η < κ and for all pi : P(ℵω)  η ∃γ0
such that ∀X ⊆ P(ℵω), ∃Y ⊆ X , Y ∈ Lγ0(P(ℵω)) such that pi′′X = pi′′Y .
We define F ′0. Let N ⊆ H(ℵω). Then we define P(ℵω)N as in Proposition 4.3:
P(ℵω)N = {
⋃
n∈ω
an : (∀n an ⊆ ℵn ∧ an ∈ N) ∧ ∀n ≤ m an ⊆ am}.
If κ is the least such that Lκ(P(ℵω)N ) ≺1 LΘL(P(ℵω)N )(P(ℵω)N ), then the situation is as before: κ is actually
the supremum of the ∆21(α) prewellorderings of P(ℵω)N , and therefore for each (N, k) ∈ E we can also fix
a ρN as in Lemma 4.12, i.e., a partial surjection from P(ℵω)N to Lκ(P(ℵω)N ) that is Σ1(α) definable from
P(ℵω)N and bounded on all sets in Lκ(P(ℵω)N ). If k : N ≺ H(ℵω), as in Proposition 4.3 we can extend it to
kˆ : P(ℵω)N → P(ℵω), and via ρN we can even try to extend it to a k¯ : Lκ(P(ℵω)N ) → Lκ(P(ℵω)): since
for any x ∈ Lκ(P(ℵω)N ) there is a a ∈ P(ℵω)N such that ρN (a) = x, we can define k¯(x) = ρ(kˆ(x)). If k
actually extends to an elementary embedding on Lκ(P(ℵω)N ), as ρn and ρ are defined with the same formula
using α as a parameter, k¯ is the only possible extension such that k¯(α) = α. Contrary to the case in Proposition
4.3, however, if k is not extendible it is not even clear if k¯ is a function, as it can be that ρN (a) = ρN (b) but
ρ(kˆ(a)) 6= ρ(kˆ(b)).
Let E be the set of pairs (N, k) ∈ L(P(ℵω)) such that
• N ⊆ H(ℵω), N = (H(ℵω))L(N);
• κ is the least such that Lκ(P(ℵω)N ) ≺1 LΘL(P(ℵω)N )(P(ℵω)N ).
• k : N ≺ H(ℵω);
• k induces k¯ : Lκ(P(ℵω)N )→ Lκ(P(ℵω));
• there exists e : P(ℵω)N  α, e ∈ Lκ(P(ℵω)N ), such that k¯(α) = α.
This is the point where we need the ω-closure of P: since P is ω-closed, then
(P(ℵω)H(ℵω))V [G] = ({
⋃
n∈ω
an : (∀n an ⊆ ℵn ∧ an ∈ H(ℵω)) ∧ ∀n ≤ m an ⊆ am})V [G] =
= {
⋃
n∈ω
an : (∀n an ⊆ ℵn ∧ an ∈ H(ℵω)) ∧ ∀n ≤ m an ⊆ am} = P(ℵω).
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Therefore (H(ℵω), j  H(ℵω)) ∈ j(E), thanks to Definition 3.1(5), Lemma 3.3 and by definition of κ, so E 6= ∅.
If Pwere not ω-closed, then it is conceivable that (P(ℵω)H(ℵω))V [G] 6= P(ℵω) and so (H(ℵω), j  H(ℵω)) /∈
j(E) and E = ∅.
For each (N, k) ∈ E , let
C(N,k) = {η < κ : cof(η) = ω, k¯(η) = η},
and for each σ ⊆ E , |σ| ≤ ℵω , let Cσ =
⋂
(N,k)∈σ C(N,k). Let F
′
0 the filter generated by the Cσ’s.
Claim 4.15 There exists T ⊆ Eκω such that F ′0  T is an ultrafilter
P r o o f. As in Proposition 4.2: Suppose that there exists a partition 〈Sξ : ξ < crt(j)〉 of F0-positive sets.
Then
j(〈Sξ : ξ < crt(j)〉) = 〈Tξ : ξ < j(crt(j))〉
is a partition of Eκω in j(F
′
0)-positive sets. By definition, C(H(ℵω),jH(ℵω)) = {η ∈ Eκω : j(η) = η)} ∈ j(F ′0),
therefore Tcrt(j) ∩ C(H(ℵω),jH(ℵω)) 6= ∅. Let η ∈ Tcrt(j) ∩ C(H(ℵω),jH(ℵω)). There must be some ξ < crt(j)
such that η ∈ Sξ. But then η = j(η) ∈ Tξ ∩ Tcrt(j), contradiction. By the proof of the Remark 2.8, using DCℵω
and the ℵω-completeness of F ′0, the Claim is proved.
Claim 4.16 Let F be the club filter on Eκω . Then F ′0  T = F  T .
P r o o f. It suffices to show that F ′0 ⊆ F : in this case, T is also stationary, so F  T is a filter that extends
F ′0  T , and since this is an ultrafilter they must be equal.
Let σ ⊆ E , |σ| ≤ ℵω then, we must prove that Cσ is an ω-club. For any (N, k) ∈ E , by definition of P(ℵω)N
the function that associatesN to Lκ(P(ℵω)N ) is Σ1(α)-definable from P(ℵω). Therefore the same is true for the
function that associates (N, k) to k¯. Now let, for any β < κ, Gβ(N, k) = k¯(β). Clearly Gβ is Σ1(α)-definable
from P(ℵω), and therefore by Lemma 4.11 Gβ is bounded on σ, and therefore sup{k¯(β) : (N, k) ∈ σ} < κ.
Subclaim 4.1 For every (N, k) ∈ E , Lκ(P(ℵω)N ) is closed under ω-sequences.
P r o o f. It is a relativization to L(P((ℵω)N )) of the fact that cof(κ) > ℵω . If 〈an : n ∈ ω〉 is such that
an ∈ Lκ(P(ℵω)N ) for any n ∈ ω, then each an is∆21(α) from P(ℵω)N . Each an can be coded as a subset An
of P(ℵω)N , so that the ω-sequence of the codes A (that, in turn, can be coded as one subset A of P(ℵω)N ) codes
〈an : n ∈ ω〉. Then A is also ∆21(α), and therefore is in Lκ(P(ℵω)N ). By developing the code, one can find
〈an : n ∈ ω〉 in Lκ(P(ℵω)N ).
Let (N, k) ∈ σ and let β0 < κ. Define βn+1 = sup(N,k)∈σ Gβn(N, k) and βω = supn∈ω βn. Then
k¯(βω) = supn∈ω k¯(βn) = βω . Therefore βω ∈ Cσ and Cσ is unbounded in κ.
As Lκ(P(ℵω)N ) is closed under ω-sequences, it is trivial that Cσ is ω-closed.
Finally, we need to prove that F ′0  T is κ-complete. Note that then also F  T will be κ-complete, so the
measurability of κ will come from the club filter, in the spirit of ω-strong measurability.
Let 〈Aξ : ξ < β〉 with β < κ such that Aξ ⊆ T and Aξ ∈ F ′0. Note that each element of E can be coded
as an element of P(ℵω), and the same is true for ℵω-sequences of elements of E . Fix therefore a surjection
G : P(ℵω)  Eℵω , and for any a ∈ P(ℵω) write CG(a) simply as Ca.
Fix a surjection pi : P(ℵω)  β (remember that κ = ΘLκ(P(ℵω))), a bijection τ : P(ℵω)→ P(ℵω)×P(ℵω)
and let pi′ = pi ◦ τ1. Let η < κ witness the Coding Lemma in Lκ(P(ℵω)) for pi′, as in Lemma 4.14. Let
A = {a ∈ P(ℵω) : Cτ2(a) ⊆ Api′(a))}.
Since for all ξ < β Aξ ∈ F ′0, each Aξ contains some Cb, therefore pi′[A] = β. Then there exists a B ⊆ A that is
in Lη(P(ℵω)) and such that pi‘[B] = β.
Let EB =
⋃{G(τ2(a)) : a ∈ B}, and for any δ < κ let
Wδ = {k¯(a) : (N, k) ∈ EB , ρN (a) = δ}.
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Then
ρ′′Wδ = {ρ(k¯(a)) : (N, k) ∈ EB , ρN (a) = δ}
= {k¯(ρN (a)) : (N, k) ∈ EB , ρN (a) = δ}
= {k¯(δ) : (N, k) ∈ EB}.
As Wδ is in Lκ(P(ℵω)), by the boundedness of ρ (4.12) ρ′′Wδ is bounded for any δ. Now iterate the process as
in 4.16 to find a δω that is a fixed point for all the k’s such that (N, k) ∈ EB , and therefore δω ∈ C(N,k). In other
words, for any a ∈ B, δω ∈ Cτ2(a).
But for every a ∈ B, Cτ2(a) ⊆ Api′(a), and therefore δω ∈ Api′(a). As pi′[B] = β, δω is in all the Aξ’s, and
therefore the intersection of all the Aξ’s is not empty, and therefore F ′0  T is κ-complete.
The added condition of ω-closure for Theorem 4.10 seems to break the harmony of Theorem 4.1. So we can
ask:
Open Problem 4.1 Is it possible to prove Theorem 4.10 just from generic I0 at ℵω?
Part of the problem seems to be this: if P is ω-closed, then P(ℵω) is a set that is easily describable from
H(ℵω), in a certain sense L(P(ℵω))V [G] can compute it correctly. But if P is not ω-closed, then we know that
P(ℵω) is in L(P(ℵω))V [G] because of the hypotheses, but it is not possible to compute it there, it is just “a”
set that extends H(ℵω), so there is no way to characterize it. A similar problem arises in I0: if there exists
j : L(Vλ+1) ≺ L(Vλ+1), then if P is a forcing notion that adds an ω-sequence in λ and G is P-generic, then
Vλ+1 /∈ L(Vλ+1)V [G]. Therefore there is the real possibility that this Open Problem is connected to Open
Problem 3.1.
5 Open problems
The most obvious question is of course:
Open Problem 5.1 Is generic I0 at ℵω consistent under large cardinals?
But this is not the only direction that the research can follow. Consider in general L(P(λ)). One of the key
points in the paper is that L(P(ℵω)) 2 AC. One can ask for which λ’s is true that L(P(λ)) 2 AC. Such question
is non trivial only when λ is singular, as it is easy to achieve when λ is regular via forcing. But:
Theorem 5.1 (Shelah, [20]) If λ is singular with uncountable cofinality, then L(P(λ))  AC.
Therefore it makes sense only for λ’s of cofinality ω. Now, under AD L(P(ω)) 2 AC. If I0 holds at λ then
L(P(λ)) 2 AC. And if generic I0 holds at ℵω then L(P(ℵω)) 2 AC. Are there other possibilities?
Open Problem 5.2 For which λ’s is true that L(P(λ)) 2 AC?
Another way to push forward the research on generic I0 would be to exploit the many results we already have
on I0. For example, in [2] the inverse limits method is developed. In the generic I0 case this is more difficult, as
the original inverse limits method uses the fact that domain and codomain of the elementary embedding are the
same, but it is possible to reflect the codomain inside the domain, as it is done in the proof of 4.3.
Open Problem 5.3 Is there an inverse limit for generic I0?
Or one can investigate the degree structure of L(P(ℵω)), as it is done in [21] for I0.
Open Problem 5.4 How is L(P(ℵω)) under generic I0 at ℵω? Does Degree Determinacy hold?
The fact that in 4.3 is proven that j can come from an ideal opens the possibility of defining proper and
non-proper elementary embeddings. Those were introduced in [25] and extensively studied in [4] and [5] for
hypotheses stronger than I0. Such hypotheses are of the form j : L(N) ≺ L(N), where Vλ+1 ≺ N ≺ Vλ+2.
Woodin in [25] defined a hierarchy of such N ’s, called E0α, so that the existence of an embedding j : L(E
0
α) ≺
L(E0α) is stronger the higher α is. For example, E
0
0 = L(Vλ+1) ∩ Vλ+2 and E01 = L(Vλ+1, (Vλ+1)]) ∩ Vλ+2, if
it exists.
Open Problem 5.5 How a generic E0α could be defined? Does it exist a non-proper elementary embedding
in such setting?
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Finally:
Open Problem 5.6 Is it possible to have generic I0 and 2ℵω > ℵω+1 in V ?
(This was studied in [6], [7] and [22] for I0).
Acknowledgements The paper was developed thanks to the generous financial support of the FWF (Austrian Science Fund)
through projects M 1514-N25 and P 27815-N25, and also under the Italian program “Rita Levi Montalcini 2013”. The author
wants to thank the Kurt Go¨del Research Center, the Institute of Discrete Mathematics and Geometry at Technische Universita¨t
Wien and the Department of Mathematical, Computer and Physical Sciences at University of Udine for their hospitality, and
the Department of Mathematics at Harvard University for the invitation that kickstarted this work.
This paper would not exist without the invaluable help of W. Hugh Woodin, whose input was the foundation of the entire
project. The author would also like to thank Rachid Atmai, Scott Cramer, Sakae Fuchino, Mohammed Golshani, Daisuke
Ikegami, Toshimichi Usuba, Liuzhen Wu for the many meaningful discussions that helped shape this work. Finally, we are
grateful to the referee for their constructive comments and suggestions.
References
[1] A. W. Apter, Successors of singular cardinals and measurability. Advances in Mathematics 55 (1985) 228–241.
[2] S. Cramer, Inverse limit reflection and the structure of L(Vλ+1). Journal of Mathematical Logic 15 (2015) 1–38.
[3] V. Dimonte, I0 and rank-into-rank axioms. Bollettino dell’Unione Matematica Italiana (2017).
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40574-017-0136-y
[4] V. Dimonte, Totally non-proper ordinals beyond L(Vλ+1). Archive for Mathematical Logic 50 (2011) 565–584.
[5] V. Dimonte, A partially non-proper Ordinal. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (2012) 1309–1321.
[6] V. Dimonte, S. Friedman, Rank-into-rank hypotheses and the failure of GCH. Archive for Mathematical Logic 53 (2014)
351–366.
[7] V. Dimonte, L. Wu, A general tool for consistency results related to I1. European Journal of Mathematics 2 (2016)
474–492.
[8] P. Erdo˝s, A. Hajnal, On the structure of set mappings. Acta Mathematica Academiae Scientiarium Hungaricae 9 (1958)
111–131.
[9] P. Erdo˝s, A. Hajnal, On a problem of B. Jo´nsson. Bulletin de l’Acade´mie Polonaise des Scienses, Se´rie des Sciences
Mathe´matiques, Astronomiques et Physiques 14 (1966) 19–23.
[10] M. Eskew, Notes on some versions of Chang’s Conjecture. Manuscript online.
[11] M. Foreman, Large cardinals and strong model theoretic transfer properties. Transactions of the American Mathematical
Society 272 (1982) 427–463.
[12] G. Kafkoulis, Coding lemmata in L(Vλ+1). Archive for Mathematical Logic 43 (2004) 193–213.
[13] A. S. Kechris, Determinacy and the structure of L(R), in A. Nerode, R. A. Shore, Recursion Theory. Proceedings of
Symposia in Pure Mathematics 42. Providence, American Mathematical Society 1985, 271–283.
[14] R. Laver, Reflection of elementary embedding axioms on the L[Vλ+1] hierarchy. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 107
(2001), 227–238.
[15] T. J. Jech, K.L. Prikry, On ideals of sets and the power set operation. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 82
(1976) 593–595.
[16] A. Kanamori, The Higher Infinite. Large cardinals in set theory from their beginnings. Second edition. Springer Mono-
graphs in Mathematics. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2003.
[17] A. Kanamori, M. Magidor, The evolution of large cardinal axioms in set theory. Higher set theory (Proc. Conf., Math.
Forschungsinst., Oberwolfach, 1977), pp. 99–275, Lecture Notes in Math. 669, Springer, Berlin, 1978.
[18] S. Shelah, Jonsson algebras in successor cardinals. Israel Journal of Mathematics 30 (1978) 57–64.
[19] S. Shelah, Cardinal Arithmetic. Oxford Logic Guides, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.
[20] S. Shelah, PCF without choice. ArXiv e-prints, (2010), [Sh:835]. arXiv:math/0510229.
[21] X. Shi, Axiom I0 and higher degree theory. Journal of Symbolic Logic 80 (2015) 970–1021.
[22] X. Shi, N. Trang, I0 and combinatorics at λ+. Archive for Mathematical Logic 56 (2017) 131–154.
[23] J. Steel, Scales in L(R). Cabal Seminar 79–81, 107–156, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, 1019, Springer, Berlin, 1983.
[24] W. H. Woodin, Suitable extender models I. Journal of Mathematical Logic 10 (2010) 101–339.
[25] W. H. Woodin, Suitable extender models II: beyond ω-huge. Journal of Mathematical Logic 11 (2011) 115–436.
Copyright line will be provided by the publisher
